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ESSAY 
IS THE STAGGERED BOARD DEBATE REALLY SETTLED? 
K.J. MARTIJN CREMERS,† SIMONE M. SEPE†† & SAURA MASCONALE††† 
The debate over staggered boards is heating up, largely because of the appearance of 
novel studies—including our own prior research—that challenge the results of earlier 
works documenting a negative impact of staggered boards on firm value. Meanwhile, 
a third way has appeared in this debate. In a recent article in the University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review, Settling the Staggered Board Debate, Professors 
Amihud, Schmid, and Davidoff Solomon (ASDS) purport to settle this debate, arguing 
that neither the position in favor or against staggered boards “has empirical support and, 
on average, a staggered board has no significant effect on firm value.” 
This Essay addresses the ASDS study and shows that the staggered board debate is 
very much alive rather than settled. It does so in two ways. First, it shows that our 
prior result that the adoption of a staggered board is associated with a positive increase 
in firm value is robust to the criticism in ASDS. Second, this Essay shows that ASDS’s 
conclusion that staggered boards have no significant association with firm value is based 
on statistical tests that have “poor power,” that is, tests that are unlikely to find a robust 
association even if such association is actually supported by the data. In contrast, the 
tests that indicate that our earlier results are robust have both much better statistical 
power and good “size,” making it unlikely that we can find a positive association 
between staggered boards and firm value if no such association exists in the data. 
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A lawyer must be told things frankly; then it’s up to us to muddle them up. 
 
ALESSANDRO MANZONI, THE BETROTHED—A TALE OF XVII CENTURY 
MILAN (Archibald Colquhoun ed., 1951). 
INTRODUCTION 
The debate over staggered boards is heating up, largely because of the 
appearance of novel studies that challenge the results of earlier works 
documenting a negative impact of staggered boards on firm value.1 This debate 
relates not just to the value of the staggered board itself, but pertains more broadly 
to the central debate over the appropriate division of authority between a 
corporation’s board and its shareholders.2 Critics of the staggered board argue that 
it entrenches directors and managers, depriving shareholders of the ability to 
discipline incumbents and hence promoting moral hazard.3 Scholars on the 
opposite side claim that the protection provided by the staggered board against 
 
1 See infra Section I.B. 
2 For a full account of the staggered board debate, see K.J. Martijn Cremers & Simone M. 
Sepe, The Shareholder Value of Empowered Boards, 68 STAN. L. REV. 67, 79-84 (2016). 
3 See id. at 82-84. 
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shareholder intervention is only temporary, generally occurs with the approval of 
shareholders, and thus constitutes a constructive, bilateral commitment device 
towards the creation of long-term firm value.4 We belong to the latter group of 
scholars, as we have documented evidence that the adoption of a staggered board 
is associated with a positive increase in firm value (and, correspondingly, the 
removal of a staggered board with a decline in firm value).5 
Meanwhile, a “third way” has appeared in the staggered board debate. 
In a recent article in the University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Professors 
Amihud, Schmid, and Davidoff Solomon (ASDS)6 purport to settle this 
debate, arguing that both the theoretical position in favor of and against 
staggered boards lack empirical support and on average, “a staggered 
board has no significant effect on firm value.”7  
More particularly, ASDS argue that, on the one hand, earlier 
empirical studies finding a negative association between having a 
staggered board and firm value “do not include important explanatory 
variables.”8 On the other hand, our more recent research documenting a 
positive association between staggered boards and firm value—and, in 
particular, the result of the article two of us (together with Lubomir 
Litov) published in the Journal of Financial Economics in 2017, Staggered 
Board and Long-Term Firm Value, Revisited (CLS)9—would not “account 
for the changing nature of the firm over time.”10 ASDS then add that 
once these issues are corrected, the adoption of a staggered board 
becomes statistically insignificant. 11 
 
4 See id. at 123-26. 
5 See K.J. Martijn Cremers, Lubomir P. Litov & Simone M. Sepe, Staggered Boards and Long-
Term Firm Value, Revisited, 126 J. FIN. ECON. 422 (2017)  (providing evidence that staggered boards 
promote value creation for some firms by committing the firm to undertaking long-term projects 
and bonding it to the relationship-specific investments of its stakeholders); K.J. Martijn Cremers, 
Saura Masconale & Simone M. Sepe, CEO Pay Redux, 96 TEX. L. REV. 205 (2017) (providing 
evidence that the adoption of a staggered board does not produce entrenchment in the form of 
excessive CEO pay); K.J. Martijn Cremers, Saura Masconale & Simone M. Sepe, Commitment and 
Entrenchment in Corporate Governance, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 727, 732, 761-71 (2016) (revisiting the 
evidence obtained on the E-Index and showing that defensive measures benefit shareholders as long 
as such measures require shareholder approval); Cremers & Sepe, supra note 2, at 100-03 (showing 
that in the time-series firm value increases (decreases) after the adoption (removal) of a staggered 
board). While the ASDS criticism focuses on prior studies by Cremers and Sepe only, for simplicity 
in the rest of this Article we will use the collective form “we” when referring to the authorship of 
those studies. 
6 Yakov Amihud, Markus Schmid & Steven Davidoff Solomon, Settling the Staggered Board 
Debate, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 1475 (2018). 
7 Id. at 1477. 
8 Id. at 1478. 
9 Cremers et al., Staggered Boards, supra note 5. 
10 Amihud et al., supra note 6, at 1475. 
11 Id. at 1479. 
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This Essay addresses the ASDS study and further contributes to the 
staggered board debate in two central ways. First, it shows that our prior 
results on how firm value changes around changes in board structure (and, in 
particular, the result in CLS) are robust to the criticism in ASDS. 
Second, this Essay shows that ASDS’s conclusion that staggered boards 
have no significant association with firm value is based on statistical tests that 
have “poor power.” That is, we show that ASDS’s tests are unlikely to find a 
robust association even in self-generated samples that are constructed such 
that they are very similar to the actual data but where we know for sure that 
such association is actually present. This means that the methodology in 
ASDS is poorly suited to finding any association between firm value and 
board structure, as we show that this methodology is biased against finding 
any statistically significant association. In contrast, the tests that indicate that 
our earlier results are robust have much better statistical power as well as good 
“size,” which means that they are unlikely to find a statistically significant 
association if such an association was not actually supported by the data. 
Thus, the ASDS study does not settle the staggered board debate. Nonetheless, 
it contributes, in part, to advance this debate. Indeed, ASDS find that 
prior studies, including the study by Professors Bebchuk and Cohen, do not 
include important explanatory variables that affect firm value and are correlated 
with the presence or absence of a staggered board. The result is that these studies 
have inappropriately attributed a lower firm value to the presence of the 
staggered board instead of to these omitted variables.12 
This result is fully consistent with the result we obtained in our prior 
staggered board studies. In these works, we revisited the 2005 cross-sectional 
study by Professors Bebchuk and Cohen (BC)13 by employing the use of a 
time-series panel (i.e., a pooled panel model with firm fixed effects)—a 
methodology that allows us to compare the average firm value before versus 
after a change in board structure.14 Through this methodology, we find that 
reverse causality explains the cross-sectional finding in BC of a negative 
association between staggered boards and firm value.15 This means that ex 
ante less valuable firms are more likely to seek increased board protection 
through adopting a staggered board (and that firm value tends to go up, not 
down, with the adoption of a staggered board), rather than increased board 
protection causing firms to become less valuable. Consistent with this result, 
 
12 Id. at 1478 (footnote omitted). 
13 Lucian A. Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, The Costs of Entrenched Boards, 78 J. FIN. ECON. 409 (2005). 
14 See Cremers et al., Staggered Boards, supra note 5, at 425-30; Cremers & Sepe, supra note 2, at 100-
03. See also infra Section I.B. (explaining the difference between a cross-sectional analysis and a time-
series analysis). 
15 See Cremers et al., Staggered Boards, supra note 5, at 433-34. 
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ASDS also find that “past performance variables have a negative effect on 
whether the firm has a staggered board.”16 
This is the beauty of ongoing debates. These debates promote further study, 
the deployment of novel analytical tools, and, hopefully, advances in research. In 
the staggered board debate, we think that one such advance has been made: the 
long-prevailing view that staggered boards are detrimental to long-term 
shareholder value is now rejected as unsupported by the data. 
The remainder of this reply is organized as follows. Part I briefly overviews the 
current status of the empirical debate on the financial value of staggered boards. 
Part II shows that the main result in CLS—that the adoption or removal of a 
staggered board is associated with a respective increase (decrease) in long-term firm 
value—is robust to the ASDS criticism. Part III employs the bootstrapping 
methodology17 to further show that the ASDS claim that staggered boards have no 
effect on firm value is only apparent because it reflects the use of a statistical 
methodology (i.e., pooled panel firm value regressions with firm fixed effects) with 
poor statistical power. Part II also shows that, in contrast, the positive association 
between staggered boards and firm value is robust when using an alternative 
methodology (i.e., change in firm value regressions) with stronger power. Last, Part 
III shows that both tests are not more likely to find evidence for any association if 
no such association is actually present in the bootstrapped samples, that is, that both 
these tests have good statistical size. Part IV discusses some of the additional 
robustness tests we performed in our prior staggered board studies, which ASDS 
ignore. Section V provides our brief conclusion. 
I. THE DEBATE ON STAGGERED BOARDS 
In order to make our discussion of Settling the Staggered Board Debate more 
accessible, this Part provides the background necessary for understanding the 
context and importance of the empirical debate on staggered boards, which 
ASDS purports to settle. While a large body of studies have examined the 
effect of staggered boards on firm value and corporate governance more 
generally, we will provide only a general description of these studies and focus 
in more detail on the two studies that ASDS attempt to replicate: the 2005 
study by BC18 and the 2017 study coauthored by CLS.19 After that, we will 
also briefly describe the main findings in ASDS. 
 
16 Amihud et al., supra note 6, at 1497. 
17 The “bootstrapping” methodology uses random sampling techniques to estimate the 
statistical properties of an estimator (i.e., the methodology that we use to estimate the association 
of staggered boards with firm value). 
18 Bebchuk & Cohen, supra note 13. 
19 Cremers et al., Staggered Boards, supra note 5. 
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A. Earlier Studies 
Earlier empirical studies exploring the wealth effects of staggered boards 
include studies employing governance indices and short-term event studies 
examining stock price reactions to the adoption/elimination of a staggered 
board.20 These studies have generally found that staggered boards are 
associated with lower firm value.  
However, as we have discussed in detail elsewhere,21 a general problem 
affecting such studies is that they exhibit significant methodological 
limitations. For example, some of the governance provisions included in a 
governance index “may matter more than others, some may have an impact 
only in specific circumstances, and others may have no impact at all.”22 And 
a general problem with short-term event studies of staggered boards is that 
short-term stock returns may bundle the market’s assessment of staggered 
boards with the market’s inferences of other firm news that might explain 
both the adoption of a staggered board and the change in firm value.23 
A different approach to evaluating the wealth effects of staggered boards is 
studying their cross-sectional association with long-term firm value.24 The 2005 
study by Bebchuk and Cohen25 is arguably the best known among the studies 
adopting this methodology. The BC study examines an eight-year span, from 
1995 to 2002.26 Using Tobin’s Q as a proxy for firm value,27 BC conclude that 
having a staggered board is associated with statistically and economically 
significant lower firm value,28 which has been interpreted to support the view 
that staggered boards hurt shareholders.29 
Cross-sectional studies of staggered boards, however, are particularly hard to 
interpret given the endogeneity of board structures. Indeed, the adoption or 
removal of a staggered board is an endogenous choice made by firms given 
particular circumstances at the time of adoption.30 Under this constraint, a cross-
 
20 See Cremers & Sepe, supra note 2, at 88-92 (discussing earlier staggered board studies in details). 
21 Id. 
22 Id. at 89. 
23 Id. at 89-90. 
24 Id. at 90. 
25 Bebchuk & Cohen, supra note 13. 
26 Id. at 410. 
27 Tobin’s Q has become the standard proxy for the financial value of the corporation in 
corporate finance studies. See id. at 419-20. Tobin’s Q is, roughly, the ratio of the market value of 
assets to the book value of assets. See Eugene F. Fama & Kenneth R. French, Testing Trade-Off and 
Pecking Order Predictions About Dividends and Debt, 15 REV. FIN. STUD. 1, 8 (2002). 
28 Bebchuk & Cohen, supra note 13, at 410. 
29 E.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth That Insulating Boards Serves Long-Term Value, 113 
COLUM. L. REV. 1637, 1681-86 (2013). 
30 See generally JEFFREY M. WOOLRIDGE, INTRODUCTORY ECONOMETRICS: A MODERN 
APPROACH 444-45 (4th ed. 2009) (describing cross-sectional analysis). 
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sectional analysis can provide useful snapshots of the association between the level 
of staggered boards and firm value over different years, identifying to what extent 
firms with a staggered board in place tend to have different financial valuations at 
particular points in time from other firms without a staggered board at that time. 
However, a cross-sectional analysis is ill-suited to capture temporal variations 
in board structure within the same set of firms, even if such analysis combines 
multiple years in a pooled panel. This is because changes in board structure tend 
to be relatively rare. As a result, the impact of any “within-firm” changes in board 
structure on firm value in a cross-sectional study is generally overwhelmed by 
differences in firm value “across firms.” In other words, cross-sectional studies 
only tend to capture differences between different sets of firms, namely firms 
with and without a staggered board, and not how changes in board structure 
relate to changes in firm value within one firm. 
This explains why a cross-sectional analysis is especially subject to 
endogeneity concerns where differences in firm value might be attributable to 
unobservable firm characteristics (an “omitted variable” problem), or where low 
firm value might motivate, rather than result from, the adoption of a staggered 
board (a particular form of a “selection problem,” generally known as the “reverse 
causality” problem).31  
In CLS we show that one important variable that the BC study omits is the 
ex ante value of the firms that adopt a staggered board.32 Controlling for the 
relatively low value of firms prior to the adoption of a staggered board shows that 
the negative cross-sectional association between having a staggered board and 
firm value can indeed be attributed to a reverse causality problem. This means 
that firms with lower ex ante value are more likely to adopt a staggered board, 
rather than the adoption of a staggered board causing firms to have a lower value. 
B. Recent Studies 
In recent years, a surge of new studies have examined the wealth effects of 
staggered boards.33 Unlike earlier studies, several of these studies find that 
staggered boards serve a positive governance function for different subsets of 
firms. For example, Professors Johnson, Karpoff, and Yi document that staggered 
boards have a positive impact on firm value in both IPO and young publicly traded 
firms (i.e., in the years immediately following the IPO), especially for firms with 
 
31 See JEFFREY M. WOOLDRIDGE, ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS OF CROSS SECTION AND PANEL 
DATA 50-51 (2002) (providing a general discussion of the specificity and simultaneity problems). 
32 Cremers et al., Staggered Boards, supra note 5, at 433-34. 
33 For a description of these studies, see Daniel M. Gallagher & Joseph A. Grundfest, Did 
Harvard Violate Federal Securities Law?: The Campaign Against Classified Boards of Directors, 33-41 
(Rock Ctr. for Corp. Governance at Stanford Univ., Working Paper No. 199, 2014), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2536586. 
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stronger stakeholder relationships.34 Professors Cen, Dasgupta, and Sen similarly 
find that staggered boards serve a positive governance function in firms where 
stakeholder relationships are important.35 
Our 2017 study (CLS) focuses on more mature firms and examines over thirty-
five years of staggering and destaggering decisions (from 1978 to 2015), 
documenting that firm value tends to increase (decrease) after firms adopt 
(remove) a staggered board, especially in firms more engaged in research and 
innovation or where stakeholder relationships matter more.36 As the primary 
identification strategy to address the endogenous choice of a staggered board, CLS 
employs a time-series analysis that considers how changes in board structure 
predict changes in firm value.37 More particularly, CLS employs two different 
time-series methodologies: (1) pooled panel regressions of firm value on board 
structure with firm fixed effects and (2) regressions of changes in firm value on 
changes in board structure. 
The first methodology—pooled panel regressions of firm value on board 
structure with firm fixed effects—allows us to estimate for each firm included in a 
panel dataset, the coefficient of a separate time-invariant dummy variable that 
captures the average value of each particular firm in the sample. Thus, once firm 
fixed effects are included, the coefficient on the staggered board is only identified 
through changes in board structure, and indicates the difference in average firm 
value before versus after a change in board structure. That is, the coefficient 
indicates how the average firm value changes after the adoption/removal of a 
staggered board within the same firm, rather than across firms. Because this 
methodology significantly mitigates both the omitted variable problem and reverse 
causality concerns, a time-series analysis with firm fixed effects is generally 
regarded as a more reliable method of identifying empirical relationships in 
econometrics than a cross-sectional analysis. More particularly, a time-series 
analysis is regarded as especially good at preventing spurious associations that are 
not really there but are only apparent because some important controlling variable 
is not included.38 
However, because changes in board structure are relatively rare, only when 
data are available for considerable lengths of time can researchers count on having 
sufficient within firm changes in board structure to perform a time-series analysis. 
 
34 William C. Johnson, Jonathan M. Karpoff & Sangho Yi, The Bonding Hypothesis of Takeover 
Defenses: Evidence from IPO Firms, 117 J. FIN. ECON. 307, 329 (2015). 
35 Ling Cen, Sudipto Dasgupta & Rik Sen, Discipline or Disruption? Stakeholder Relationships and 
the Effect of Takeover Threat, 62 MGMT. SCIENCE 2820, 2820 (2016). 
36 Cremers et al., Staggered Boards, supra note 5, at 423. 
37 Id. 
38 See, e.g., Jerry A. Hausman & William E. Taylor, Panel Data and Unobservable Individual 
Effects, 49 ECONOMETRICA 1377, 1377 (1981) (stating that using fixed effects represents a common 
method of controlling for omitted variables). 
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Furthermore, as pooled panel regressions of firm value with firm fixed effects 
estimate how the average firm value changes, such estimation may be noisy in 
periods when firm values fluctuate substantially in ways that are not highly 
systematic. As a result, pooled panel regressions of firm value with firm fixed 
effects may have “poor power,” i.e., have a poor ability to identify an association 
of board structure with firm value that is actually present in the data if the sample 
is too short, too noisy, or has too few changes in board structure. 
The second time-series methodology we employ in CLS—regressions of 
changes in firm value on changes in board structure—allows us to control for 
changes in other firm characteristics that the previous literature found to be related 
to firm value. Similar to the coefficient on board structure in pooled panel 
regressions with firm fixed effects, the coefficient of changes in board structure 
estimated in change in firm value regressions is only identified from changes in 
board structure; that is, from cases where firms adopt or remove a staggered board. 
However, firm fixed effect regressions estimate differences in the average firm 
value before versus after changes in board structure. Instead, change-in-value 
regressions estimate whether firm value changes immediately following the change in 
board structure, where it is possible that such changes would subsequently be 
reversed (e.g., due to other, perhaps unrelated, changes affecting the firm). Further, 
in change-in-value regressions, changes to firm value following changes in board 
structure are not compared to firm value in the full period before the change in 
board structure but only to firm value closely prior to the change in board structure. 
It follows that change-in-firm-value regressions can more easily pick up time-
series associations in shorter samples—that is, this methodology has more power 
to find an association in samples that are shorter, noisier or with fewer changes. Yet, 
a potential downside of change-in-firm-value regressions is that the estimated 
changes may not be permanent, unlike the changes that are captured through the 
use of firm fixed effects in a sufficiently long sample. This explains why one should 
employ both methodologies whenever possible, as each methodology has different 
advantages and drawbacks. 
In addition to using these time-series methodologies, CLS confirms the 
positive association between the adoption of a staggered board and firm value 
through several other identification strategies. As we discuss in more detail 
in Part IV, these strategies include the use of matched samples, a quasi-natural 
experiment employing a 1990 change in Massachusetts’s legislation on 
staggered boards, and a simultaneous-system approach that dynamically 
models endogenous changes in firm value, board structure, and other firm 
18 University of Pennsylvania Law Review Online [Vol. 167: 9 
characteristics.39 Further, the main result in CLS is also consistent with the 
results we obtain in several other related studies.40  
C. Settling the Debate? 
As highlighted in the Introduction, ASDS defends the view that staggered 
boards have no significant association with firm value. They reach this conclusion 
by examining the cross-sectional and time-series association of firm value and board 
structure in a sample of nearly 3,000 firms from 1990 to 2013 and, purportedly, 
showing that “prior studies [finding either a negative association or a positive 
association between staggered boards and firm value] are not robust to different 
estimation models.”41 More particularly, ASDS focus on BC as the most prominent 
among earlier studies and CLS as the most comprehensive among more recent 
studies analyzing the association between firm value and board structure.42 
ASDS’s methodological criticism of BC, which substantially replicates our own 
prior criticism of that study,43 is that BC omit important explanatory variables in 
their analysis that affect both the likelihood of adopting a staggered board and firm 
value.44 ASDS replicate BC’s cross-sectional analysis in a sample covering 1990–
2013, finding that the negative association between staggered boards and firm value 
becomes insignificant when they add more controls.45 They then show that the 
other entrenchment provisions included in the E-index developed by Bebchuk, 
Cohen, and Ferrell,46 as well as ex ante low firm value, are important omitted 
variables in BC’s analysis.47 These results are, again, fully consistent with similar 
tests we performed in CLS as well as the 2016 legal companion of that article, The 
Shareholder Value of Empowered Boards.48   
 
39 See Cremers et al., Staggered Boards, supra note 5, at 423-24 (describing these additional tests). 
40 See Cremers et al., CEO Pay Redux, supra note 5, at 247-48 (examining the interplay between 
CEO pay and staggered boards); Cremers et al., Commitment, supra note 5, at 732, 761-74 (challenging 
the inclusion of the staggered board among the provisions that produce value-decreasing 
entrenchment); K.J. Martijn Cremers & Simone M. Sepe, Institutional Investors, Corporate 
Governance, and Firm Value, 41 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 387, 415-16 (2018) (examining the interplay 
between staggered boards and institutional investor horizons); Cremers & Sepe, supra note 2 
(examining the time period 1978–2011 and documenting that staggered boards are associated with a 
positive increase in firm value by employing a time-series analysis with firm fixed effects). 
41 Amihud et al., supra note 6, at 1477. 
42 Id. at 1478-79. 
43 See supra notes 31–32 and accompanying text. 
44 Amihud et al., supra note 6, at 1489-95. 
45 Id. at 1490-91 tbl.1. 
46 Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Allen Ferrell, What Matters in Corporate Governance?, 22 
REV. FIN. STUD. 783, 784-85 (2009). 
47 Amihud et al., supra note 6, at 1492 tbl.2, 1496 tbl.3. 
48 Cremers & Sepe, supra note 2. 
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ASDS then moves to the methodological criticism of CLS: that a time-series 
analysis with firm fixed effects does not “account for the changing nature of the 
firm over time.”49 They argue: 
[S]ome firm characteristics change over time . . . and these changes may induce 
firms to adopt a staggered board or to destagger their board, while at the same 
time affecting firm value. The reason for the earlier results [in CLS] may be 
related to unobserved changing characteristics . . . which caused the relationship 
between a staggered board and firm value. It may have been these changing 
characteristics themselves rather than related changes in staggered board status 
that affected value.50 
In order to test this criticism, ASDS first replicate the time-series analysis in 
CLS over their 1991–2013 sample51 and then over two subsamples, 1991–2002 and 
2003–2013.52 The reason for splitting the sample, they say, is to “allow for the 
unobserved firm characteristics to vary over time and have their own effect on 
value . . . .”53 
The results of ASDS Table 4 show that in the full ASDS sample (covering 
1991–2013), the impact of staggered board on firm value is generally positive and 
statistically significant.54 However, once they split their full sample in two, they 
find that the effect of the staggered board on firm value becomes statistically 
insignificant in both subsamples (covering 1991–2002 and 2003–2013 
respectively). 
They then conclude: 
 
49 Amihud et al., supra note 6, at 1475. 
50 Id. at 1498. 
51 It it is also worth emphasizing that ASDS’s controlled full sample is approximately half of our 
controlled full sample in CLS. In fact, the statistically significant results they find in the specifications 
for their full sample are consistent with the results for the subsample (1996–2015) examined in Table 3, 
Column 6 of our JFE paper. Cremers et al., Staggered Boards, supra note 5, at 429. 
52 Amihud et al., supra, note 6, at 1500 tbl.4. 
53 Id. at 1498. 
54 Id. at 1500. In ASDS Table 4, column 1 (i.e., the model without ownership variables and without 
the Modified E-Index), ASDS find a positive staggered board coefficient with a t-statistics of 1.596, 
which is only marginally insignificant. Id. (If the t-statistics were 1.645 or higher, they should have 
reported a significant result also for that specification.) However, we cannot fully replicate this result. 
Indeed, if we use our sample and specifications as in Table 3 of CLS—Q regressions with firm and fixed 
effects and only basic controls—but then restrict our sample to 1991-2013 (as in ASDS), we find a 
statistically significant coefficient of Staggered Board equal to 0.075 with a t-statistic of 2.11. Using 
analogous regressions but using log(Q) as in ASDS, we find a statistically significant coefficient of 
Staggered Board equal to 0.034 with a t-statistic of 2.25. Our sample size of 24,413 observations in these 
regressions is very similar to the sample size of 24,295 that ASDS report for column 1 of their Table 4. 
See id. One possible explanation for the difference between ASDS’s results and our replication is that 
ASDS may use staggered board data that are qualitatively different than ours. For example, ASDS report 
using the staggered board data from IRRC, which is only updated bi-annually before 2006. Id. at 1487-
88. In our dataset, instead, we hand-checked changes in board structure in the missing years (e.g., 2001, 
2003, and 2005). See infra Section III.A. 
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In sum, the evidence on the value of staggered boards is mixed. Bebchuk, 
Cohen, and others have found a staggered board has a wealth-decreasing 
effect; Cremers, Litov, Sepe, and others have found a staggered board has a 
wealth-increasing effect. The differences between the studies is attributable 
to the different methods they employ to account for omitted variables . . . .55 
Before discussing ASDS’s specific criticisms of CLS, we note here that 
ASDS’s conclusion about existing staggered board studies is only partially 
accurate. While the different results in BC and CLS can certainly be attributed to 
different estimation methods, ASDS omits the substantial difference between 
identifying a cross-sectional versus a time-series association. Specifically, BC rely 
on a cross-sectional study to examine the association of staggered boards with firm 
value over an eight-year period. CLS, instead, employ a time-series analysis over a 
much longer thirty-seven-year period. The difference between these methodologies, 
as explained above, reflects a fundamentally improved identification strategy, 
which amounts to the difference between comparing different firms with different 
board structures in a cross-sectional analysis, and comparing changes within the 
same firm that modifies its board structure in a time-series analysis. It follows that 
the time-series evidence of CLS—namely that firm value tends to increase 
(decrease) after firms adopt (remove) a staggered board—should be distinguished 
from prior cross-sectional results that are more subject to endogeneity (or 
selection) concerns,56 rather than ambiguously concluding that the current 
evidence on staggered boards is “mixed.” 
II. ON THE ROBUSTNESS OF RECENT STUDIES 
In this Part, we examine ASDS’s main criticism of CLS—that our results are 
not robust in taking into account the changing nature of firm characteristics over 
time. We begin our discussion by detailing some preliminary observations 
concerning their analysis. After that, we will explain that the ASDS methodology 
of examining our results in fairly short subperiods involves an important tradeoff, 
which ASDS omits to discuss. On the one hand, splitting a longer sample into 
shorter subperiods—as ASDS do when they split their 1991–2013 full sample in 
two subperiods for 1991–2001 and 2002–2013—allows one to better control for 
changes in unobserved firm characteristics, addressing an important endogeneity 
concern. On the other hand, however, using two subperiods and analyzing those 
periods independently assumes that there is nothing we can learn across periods. 
More importantly, doing so has the downside of making less data available, 
resulting in a loss of statistical power and weakening the ability  of a model with 
 
55 Amihud et al., supra note 6, at 1484. 
56 See supra Section I.A. 
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firm fixed effects—such as that employed in ASDS to replicate CLS—to find an 
association even when such association is actually supported by the data. 
A. Preliminary Observations 
The first preliminary observation concerns the sample ASDS employ in 
replicating the pooled panel regressions with firm fixed effects in CLS. Their 
sample covers the period 1991–2013, while our sample is much longer and covers 
the period 1978–2015. Further, they state that “from 1990–2006, [ASDS] follow 
Professors Bebchuk, Cohen, Ferrell, Gompers, Ishii, Metrick, and others by 
assuming a firm’s governance provisions as reported in a given IRRC volume 
remained in place during the period following the publication of the volume until 
the publication of the subsequent volume.”57 
Conversely, the CLS study handchecked all missing years that were skipped by 
the IRRC volumes, incorporating many changes that occurred during the years in 
which IRRC did not update their data.58 In particular, for those firms, the changes 
in board structure actually occurred one year before the changes appear in any 
IRRC volume. While we do not have the exact data used in ASDS, we demonstrate 
below that the positive time-series association between firm value and staggered 
boards is stronger in our sample even when we restrict it to exactly the same period 
as used in ASDS and have otherwise the same specifications, suggesting that 
differences in board structure data may be the cause of some of the different results 
in CLS and ASDS. 
A second preliminary observation concerns the econometric specification 
employed in ASDS. Unlike BC and CLS, which use a linear-linear (or level-level) 
model, where firm value is proxied by Tobin’s Q, ASDS uses a log-level model by 
employing the logarithmic transformation of Tobin’s Q.59 Using the log-linear 
functional form does not change much, as the correlation between Q and log(Q) in 
the sample is approximately ninety-seven percent. Intuitively, the log(Q) 
specification reduces the influence of outlier observations: here, the influence of 
firms with high values of Q. In CLS, as in most of the literature, Q itself is the 
dependent variable, and the influence of outliers is reduced through winsorizing 
the data.60 When we use log-level specifications (i.e., with the log of Q as the 
dependent variable) in our sample, our results become even more significant, 
economically and statistically. Therefore, this Essay’s use of a level-level model—
that is, the use of Q as the dependent variable rather than the log of Q, as in 
ASDS—should be interpreted as a conservative strategy. 
 
57 Amihud et al., supra note 6, at 1488. 
58 See Cremers et al., Staggered Boards, supra note 5, at 424-25. 
59 Amihud et al., supra note 6, at 1489. 
60 See Cremers et al., Staggered Boards, supra note 5, at 427. 
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B. Data and Subsamples 
While ASDS end their sample in 2013, for consistency with CLS, in this Essay 
we use data up to 2015. However, we verified that our results remain similar if we 
end the sample in 2013, as in ASDS. 
The “correction” ASDS employs for the alleged inability of our model with 
firm fixed effects to “account for the changing nature of the firm over time”61 is 
splitting the full sample in two, arguing that this is useful to “allow for the 
unobserved firm characteristics to vary over time and have their own effect on 
value . . . .”62 It is thus important to understand the implications of this test in 
full. Figure 1 of CLS, which we reproduce below and which shows the percentage 
of firms with a staggered board in 1978–2015 in our sample, helps to the task. 
 
FIGURE 1: PERCENTAGE OF FIRMS WITH A  
STAGGERED BOARD IN 1978–2015 
 
 
61 Amihud et al., supra note 6, at 1475. 
62 Id. at 1498. 
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As shown by Figure 1, there are two major trends in board structure variation 
in the sample: one from 1978 to 1990, with many firms adopting a staggered board, 
and a second from 2003 (more rapidly from 2005) to 2015, with many firms 
removing a staggered board. In the period 1991–2002 there is, instead, very little 
time variation in board structure, as very few firms either adopted or removed a 
staggered board over this period. 
These trends matter because, as noted above,63 the purpose of employing a 
time-series analysis with firm fixed effects in examining the value implications of 
staggered boards is to allow empiricists to compare the average Q before versus after 
a change in board structure, which emphasizes the importance of having sufficient 
time variation in a panel to accurately estimate such changes in valuation over time. 
It follows that in a time-series analysis, we should expect to find no significant 
association between Q and board structure during the period 1991–2002—even if 
such association was present in the actual data—as Figure 1 shows that there is very 
little variation in board structure during that period. This means, as we discuss in 
more details in CLS,64 that in the time-series we cannot derive any inference about 
the value implications of staggered boards during that period. 
This conclusion makes the choice of ASDS subsamples hard to understand, as 
their first subsample (1991–2002) covers exactly the period for which CLS 
document almost no time-series variation in board structure. It is thus unsurprising 
that they find no statistically significant results for the first subsample. We 
accordingly ignore the results for that subsample and focus on the second ASDS 
subsample, spanning from 2003 to 2013 (2003 to 2015 in our reply, where we use the 
full available data). 
C. Firm Fixed Effects Regressions and Change in Q Regressions 
In examining the ASDS results for the subsample starting in 2003, we begin 
again with a few preliminary observations. The general idea behind employing 
smaller subperiods is that doing so provides a robustness check to results obtained 
for a longer period. However, doing so also reduces the amount of data available 
for the estimation by limiting both time variation in board structure and the 
amount of data available for estimating average levels of Q. This implies that using 
firm fixed effects regressions with only eleven years, as ASDS do for the second 
subsample, may so reduce the statistical power of firm fixed effects regressions as 
to make this methodology unable to identify any association between staggered 
boards and firm value, even if there is actually one present in the data. As explained 
above, employing regressions of changes in firm value on changes in board 
 
63 See supra Section I.B. 
64 CLS also includes a very instructive figure (Figure 2) showing the cohorts of staggering up 
and staggering down. Cremers et al., Staggered Boards, supra note 5, at 429-30. 
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structure can mitigate this limitation, but ASDS do not consider CLS’s use of this 
additional methodology. 
1. Firm Fixed Effects Regressions 
With these observations in mind, we first examine the robustness of CLS’s 
results for pooled panel Q regressions with firm fixed effects in Table 1, Panel A 
below. We start in Column 1 with the 1996–2015 sample, which we use as 
our reference regression, finding a statistically significant positive time-
series association between staggered boards and firm value. We start in 
1996 rather than 1993 (as in ASDS) mainly because the subsample period 
1996–2015 is exactly the same we use in CLS, when we split our own full 
sample in two (i.e., 1978–1995 and 1996–2015).65 We verify, however, that 
our results remain statistically significant if we start the sample earlier 
(e.g., in 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, or 1995). 
We then report the results for the additional following subsamples: 1997–2015, 
1998–2015, 1999–2015, 2000–2015, 2001–2015, 2002–2015, and 2003–2015. We find 
that when we start the subsample in 2000 or earlier, rather than in 2003 as in ASDS, 
the association between staggered boards and firm value remains positive and 
statistically significant. Only if we start the sample in 2001, 2002, or 2003, does the 
coefficient of Staggered Board (i.e., the dummy variable indicating that the firm has 
a staggered board) become insignificant, as in ASDS. 
Next, in Table 1, Panel B, we use the ASDS specification with the log-level 
model (log(Q)). With this different specification, the staggered board results 
remain significant when the sample starts in 2001 or earlier. This means that if 
ASDS had started their second subsample in 2001 rather than 2003 in their 
regressions of Table 4, they would presumably have found a positive and statistically 
significant coefficient. We also observe that the t-statistics with the log-
transformation of Q are generally higher, confirming that the level-level model that 
we use is a conservative choice. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
65 Id. at 429 tbl.3, col.6. 
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TABLE 1: FIRM VALUE AND STAGGERED BOARDS 
This table presents annual pooled panel Q regressions on Staggered Board with firm and 
year fixed effects (f.e.). All specifications include the following regression variables: Staggered 
Board[t-1], Ln(Assets)[t-1], Delaware incorporation[t-1], ROA[t-1], CAPX/Assets[t-1], R&D/ Sales[t-1], and 
Industry M&A volume[t-1].66 We use Q as the dependent variable in Panel A, and log(Q) in 
Panel B. In each column, we use a different time period, starting with 1996–2015 in column 
(1), which replicates the result in column (6) of Table 3 in CLS. We only show the coefficient 
of Staggered Board[t-1] in order to save space. T-statistics (in their absolute value) are based on 
robust standard errors clustered by firm and presented in parentheses below the coefficients. 
Statistical significance of the coefficients is indicated at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels by ***, **, 
and *, respectively. 
 
Panel A. Pooled Panel Regressions Using Q 
 
 
 
 
 
 
66 Ln(Assets)[t-1] is the log of the book value of total assets; Delaware incorporation[t-1] is a dummy variable 
indicating if the firm is incorporated in Delaware; ROA[t-1] is the return on assets calculated as the ration of 
the firm’s EBITDA142 over the book value of total assets; CAPX/Assets[t-1] is the ratio of capital expenditures 
over the book value of total assets; R&D/ Sales[t-1] is the ratio of research and development expenditures over 
sales; and Industry M&A volume[t-1] is the ratio of mergers and acquisitions’ dollar volume in SDC to the total 
market capitalization from CRSP per Fama-French 49 industries. 
Dependent variable: Q[t] 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
Period: 
 
1996– 
2015 
1997– 
2015 
1998– 
2015 
1999– 
2015 
2000– 
2015 
2001– 
2015 
2002– 
2015 
2003– 
2015 
Staggered board[t-1] 0.098**** 0.103*** 0.097*** 0.087*** 0.067** 0.051 0.038 0.024 
 
(2.72) (2.88) (2.75) (2.59) (2.06) (1.58) (1.22) (0.81) 
     
    
Control included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm + year f.e. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 21,454 20,593 19,733 18,561 17,473 16,359 15,261 13,866 
Adj. R2 0.758 0.760 0.763 0.773 0.784 0.791 0.795 0.807 
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Panel B. Pooled panel regressions using log(Q) 
 
 
 
The trends in Figure 1 and the results in Table 1 cast doubt on the conclusion 
that ASDS derive by splitting their sample in two. More generally, these findings 
highlight how using separate subsamples with firm fixed effects is an extreme way 
to deal with how associations might change over time. This is because, with firm 
fixed effects, as discussed above,67 the regression’s coefficients are only identified 
from within-firm time variation. Therefore, the smaller the time period 
considered—and hence the fewer the changes in board structure contained in the 
data and the more limited the availability of data to estimate how the average level 
of Q has changed—the more difficult it is to identify any time-series associations 
even if these associations do actually exist. Therefore, as we will explore in more 
detail in Part III, a reasonable explanation for the insignificant time-series 
association between firm value and board structure ASDS find when splitting the 
sample in two is that models with firm fixed effects have “poor power”; that is, a 
poor ability to find any association even if such association is actually present in the 
data, especially when these models are employed over relatively short samples. 
Also recall that once firm fixed effects are included, the coefficient of Staggered 
Board captures the difference in the average Q before versus after changes in board 
structure. Thus, when the ASDS 1991–2013 sample is split into the two sub-periods 
of 1991–2002 and 2003–2013, changes in board structure that occur around the split 
of 2002–2003 are removed from the data, no longer showing up as changes in board 
structure in either of the separate samples. This further means that changes in 2004 
 
67 See supra Section I.B. 
Dependent variable: log(Q[t]) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
Period: 
 
1996– 
2015 
1997– 
2015 
1998– 
2015 
1999– 
2015 
2000– 
2015 
2001– 
2015 
2002– 
2015 
2003– 
2015 
  
Staggered board[t-1] 0.045*** 0.048*** 0.046*** 0.042*** 0.034** 0.028* 0.021 0.017 
 (3.06) (3.22) (3.13) (2.95) (2.39) (1.95) (1.45) (1.21) 
     
    
Control included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm + year f.e. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 21,454 20,593 19,733 18,561 17,473 16,359 15,261 13,866 
Adj. R2 0.779 0.782 0.784 0.793 0.802 0.806 0.810 0.821 
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have only one observation of Q in the period before the change, rendering a 
comparison between the average Q before and after the change considerably more 
noisy. Moreover, changes in 2005 appear in the ASDS sample as changes in 2006, 
as IRRC did not update their data in 2005.68 As a result, for the firms where the 
board structure changed in 2005, the methodology in ASDS estimates the average 
Q before the change as the average Q in 2003, 2004, and 2005 (controlling for other 
firm characteristics in the regression, of course), though 2005 already covers the 
period after the change in board structure. 
2. Change-in-Q Regressions 
A way to address the methodological limitation affecting firm-fixed-effects 
regressions is using change-in-firm-value regressions to verify a time-series 
association. Indeed, as we explained above, change-in-firm-value regressions can 
more easily pick up time-series associations in shorter samples, because changes in 
firm value are not compared to the average firm value in the full period before the 
change in board structure, but only to the firm value closely prior to the change in 
board structure. 
Using change-in-Q regressions, CLS obtains similar results to the firm-fixed-
effects regressions for the full 1978–2015 sample, with an increase (decrease) in Q 
after a firm adopts (removes) a staggered board, and where the changes in Q are 
not immediate but materialize in the second year after the change in board 
structure.69 In Table 2 below, we thus use the same methodology as in CLS of 
regressing the changes in Q from one to three years after the change in board 
structure for the same sub-samples as in Table 1 (1996–2015, 1997–2015, 1998–2015, 
1999–2015, 2000–2015, 2001–2015, 2002–2015, and 2003–2015). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
68 See supra notes 63–64 and accompanying text. 
69 Cremers et al., supra note 6, at 431 tbl.4. 
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TABLE 2: CHANGES IN FIRM VALUE AND CHANGES  
IN STAGGERED BOARDS 
This table presents pooled panel first difference regressions with the dependent variable 
being the change in Q from t to t+1 in Panel A (i.e., ∆ Q[t, t+1]), the change in Q from t to t+2 
in Panel B (i.e., ∆ Q[t, t+2]), and the change in Q from t to t+3 in Panel C (i.e., ∆ Q[t, t+3]). The 
dependent variables have been demeaned with their annual cross-sectional averages. As 
independent variables, we include the following: ∆ Staggered Board[t-1,t], ∆ Ln(Assets)[t-1,t], ∆ 
ROA[t-1,t], ∆ CAPX/Assets[t-1,t], ∆ R&D/Sales[t-1,t], and ∆ Industry M&A volume[t-1,t]. In each 
column, we use a different time period, starting with 1996–2015 in column (1), which 
replicates the result in columns (7)–(9) of Table 4 in CLS. We only show the coefficient of 
∆ Staggered Board[t-1] in order to save space. All variables are defined in Appendix Table 1. T-
statistics (in their absolute value) are based on robust standard errors clustered by firm and 
presented in parentheses below the coefficients. Statistical significance of the coefficients is 
indicated at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels by ***, **, and *, respectively. 
 
 
 Consistent with our criticism of the results in ASDS (and consistent with our 
prior results in CLS), Table 2, Panel A shows that the average change in Q a year 
after the change in board structure is insignificant, but it becomes consistently 
positive and statistically significant in the second and third years after the change 
in board structure, for all periods considered (including 2003–2015, for which the 
firm fixed effects results are insignificant). It is also worth highlighting that the 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
Period: 
 
1996– 
2015 
1997– 
2015 
1998– 
2015 
1999– 
2015 
2000– 
2015 
2001– 
2015 
2002– 
2015 
2003– 
2015 
         
Panel A: Dependent variable: ∆ Q[t, t+1] 
∆Staggered board[t-1] 0.00138 0.028 0.027 0.031 0.030 -0.004 0.006 -0.001 
 
(0.06) (1.13) (1.12) (1.35) (1.28) (-0.17) (0.25) (-0.06) 
     
    
Panel B: Dependent variable: ∆ Q[t, t+2] 
∆Staggered board[t-1] 
 
0.0728* 0.094** 0.095** 0.094** 0.092** 0.082** 0.080** 0.074* 
 (1.82) (2.43) (2.47) (2.37) (2.33) (2.26) (2.18) (1.95) 
         
Panel C: Dependent variable: ∆ Q[t, t+3] 
∆Staggered board[t-1] 0.135*** 0.123*** 0.123*** 0.131*** 0.138*** 0.120** 0.113** 0.112** 
 (2.91) (2.88) (2.86) (2.85) (3.02) (2.50) (2.35) (2.15) 
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effect on firm value is monotonically increasing over time after the change in board 
structure. In particular, even when we only use the 2003–2015 time period, we find 
that after the adoption (or dismissal) of a staggered board, the value of Q increases 
(decreases) over time, where the changes in Q are strongly significant three years 
after the change in board structure.70 
We thus conclude that the results in Table 1 and Table 2 of this Essay contradict 
the ASDS criticism of the results in CLS about the positive time-series association 
between firm value and staggered boards, showing that CLS’s results  are robust 
III. THE PURPORTED INSIGNIFICANT ASSOCIATION OF STAGGERED 
BOARDS AND FIRM VALUE 
In this Part, we employ the bootstrapping methodology, which uses random 
sampling techniques to estimate the statistical properties of an estimator,71 to 
further explore the claims in ASDS and the validity of the results in CLS.  
This advanced methodology shows, first, that firm-fixed-effects regressions 
and change-in-value regressions are not more likely to find evidence for any 
association if no such association is actually present in the data; that is, both these 
tests have good statistical “size.” Second, the use of bootstrapping also confirms 
that the difference in results for firm-fixed-effects regressions and change-in-Q 
 
70 A further criticism of ASDS deserves attention here. ASDS observe that the conclusion that staggered 
boards have no impact on firm value is consistent with the results obtained in another of our staggered board 
studies, Board Declassification Activism: The Financial Value of the Shareholder Right Project (the SRP study). 
See K.J. Martijn Cremers & Simone M. Sepe, Board Declassification Activism: The Financial 
Value of the Shareholder Rights Projects (June 2017) (working paper), available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2962162. In that work, we employ the 
declassification activity of the Harvard Shareholder Rights Project (SRP)—a clinical program at 
Harvard Law School assisting institutional investors with submitting board declassification proposals 
during the period 2011–2014—as a quasi-natural experiment to examine the value implications of 
staggered boards. In other words, we treat the SRP’s activity as a source of exogenous variation in 
recent declassification campaigns to test the wealth effects of staggering/destaggering activity while 
mitigating well-known endogeneity concerns. Consistent with the results in CLS, we find that 
declassifying SRP targets declined in value after declassification. In ASDS’s words, however, the SRP 
study would ultimately contradict the results in CLS as it also finds that “destaggering has no significant effect 
on the value of firms not targeted by the Harvard Rights Project.” Amihud et al., supra note 6, at 1501. 
However, we have explained elsewhere why this is an inaccurate interpretation of that study’s results. See 
Martijn K.J. Cremers & Simone M. Sepe, Board Declassification Activism: Why Run Away from the Evidence? 
(June 2017) (working paper), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2991854 
(replying to criticism of the SRP study by Lucian Bebchuk and Alma Cohen). If one wants to focus on results 
for non-SRP declassifications, one should do so in conjunction with the evidence in CLS, as the non-SRP 
declassifications in the SRP study are only a small subset of the declassifications studied in CLS. Accordingly, 
under the argument that non-SRP declassifications matter independently from SRP declassifications—which 
ASDS seem to accept—the results in the SRP study need to be interpreted jointly with the results for the 
much longer sample in CLS. Performing this analysis shows that the results in the SRP study are fully 
consistent with the evidence in CLS. See id. 
71 An estimator is the methodology one uses to estimate a given empirical association, i.e., in 
this case the association between staggered boards with firm value. 
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regressions over shorter sample periods can be explained by the difference in the 
statistical “power” of each methodology. Indeed, the change-in-value regressions 
have substantially better statistical power than the firm-fixed-effects regressions 
and hence are more capable of finding a time-series association between firm value 
and board structure.  
Therefore, the analysis in this Part further confirms the validity of the results 
in CLS and the lack of robustness of the ASDS results.  
A. Bootstrapping and Statistical Inference 
Before starting the discussion of the bootstrapping analysis of the results in 
ASDS, in order to make this analysis accessible to a wide audience of nontechnical 
readers, it is useful to briefly recap here some key statistical concepts. These 
concepts include Type I and Type II errors, as well as the basic principles of using 
bootstrapped samples to assess the size and power of statistical tests. To this end, 
we start by considering the hypothesis that, as argued by ASDS, Q is not associated 
with board structure, i.e., that the “true” coefficient of the staggered board in Q 
regressions is equal to zero (the null hypothesis in ASDS). Type I errors occur when 
the null hypothesis is true—in this case, when there is actually no association 
between firm value and board structure—but one empirically rejects the null (false 
positive). Instead, Type II errors occur when one does not reject the null hypothesis 
and the null is actually false (false negative). Hence, here, a Type II error would 
occur if one found no statistically significant association between firm value and 
board structure but such association was actually present in the data.  
According to ASDS, the results in CLS would have a high probability of 
suffering from a Type I error, meaning that the methodologies used in CLS are 
likely to find a statistically significant association between firm value and board 
structure even if there is actually no such association in the data. Indeed, the high 
likelihood of a Type I error is the reason in ASDS for both adding controls and 
considering shorter subperiods. Conversely, our results from Table 1 and Table 2 
above seem to suggest that the analysis in ASDS might suffer from a Type II error, 
under which the methodology ASDS use does not allow them to find any 
statistically significant association between firm value and board structure but such 
association is actually present in the data.  
In order to examine these opposite hypotheses, we start by employing the 
bootstrapping methodology to test the “size” of both firm-fixed-effect regressions 
and change-in-value regressions. A size test estimates how often one would find a 
statistically significant coefficient in artificial samples, which are constructed 
through bootstrapping to be very similar to the actual data, but in such a way that 
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we know for a fact (i.e., by construction) that there is no actual association.72 We 
then also employ the bootstrapping methodology to test the “power” of each 
methodology, constructing bootstrapped samples for the “power” test in a very 
similar way to the bootstrapped samples for the “size” test, except that in this case 
we know for sure that in each bootstrapped sample there is, by design, a positive 
association between firm value and board structure.73 
While a full discussion of the technicalities of bootstrapping is not within the 
scope of this Essay, we hope to illustrate the intuition behind the size and power 
tests by considering the following, 
i. 𝑋𝑋0: means finding no statistically significant time-series association 
between Q and board structure in the data; 
ii. 𝑋𝑋1: means finding a statistically significant time-series association 
between Q and board structure in the data; 
iii. 𝑌𝑌0: means the actual time-series association between Q and board 
structure is zero; and 
 
72 Specifically, each bootstrapped sample is constructed in the following way. We first estimate 
the regression of Q on Staggered Board plus the set of standard controls, exactly as in column 1 of 
Table 1, Panel A above. Next, we decompose each observation of Q into (i) the part that is fitted by 
the regression coefficients excluding the Staggered Board coefficient (i.e., multiplying all other 
coefficients, including on all fixed effects, with the values of all variables), (ii) the part that is fitted 
by the regression coefficient on Staggered Board (i.e., that coefficient times the value of the Staggered 
Board dummy variable), and (iii) the part of actual Q that is not explained by any of the variables, 
including the Staggered Board indicator, the controls and all of the fixed effects, i.e., the residual part. 
Second, each new sample consists of “artificial” values of Q that are constructed by combining 
the first and third part, but leaving out the second part. By construction, the first and third parts are 
statistically uncorrelated with the Staggered Board indicator, and thus the sum of the first and third 
part will be uncorrelated with the Staggered Board indicator as well. In each bootstrapped sample, 
each firm’s first part is combined with the full available history of the residual part of a randomly 
chosen firm (with replacement, though results are identical when we randomly assign residual parts 
without replacement), matched by year (such that the first part for, e.g., the year 2006 is combined 
with the residual part of a randomly chosen firm for 2006 as well). 
Because a key feature of Tobin’s Q is that it tends to be persistent at the firm level and 
heteroskedastic (i.e., the variance of the error terms differ across firm, and residuals are correlated 
within firms), in the procedure we retain the full correlation structure of the actual Tobin’s Q (of 
the data) in our bootstrapped samples. The use of the full history of the residual part ensures that 
the bootstrapped data will have similar cross-sectional and time-series correlations as the actual data. 
Finally, we randomly assign a staggered board to firms in the sample, such that in each 
bootstrapped sample, in each year the number of firms with a bootstrapped staggered board is equal 
to the number of firms with a staggered board in the actual data, and such that the number of firms 
adopting and removing a staggered board is as well equal to the actual data. In summary, the 
bootstrapped samples for the size test that result are very similar to the actual data, except that we 
know for sure that in each bootstrapped “artificial data” sample there is, by construction, no 
association between firm value and the randomly assigned board structure. 
73 This positive association is created by taking the bootstrapped samples from the “size” tests, 
and permanently increasing (decreasing) the bootstrapped values of Q after a firm is randomly 
assigned to adopt (remove) a staggered board, where our choices of the magnitude of these changes 
are explained in more detail below. 
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iv. 𝑌𝑌1: means the actual time-series association between Q and board 
structure is nonzero. 
When an empiricist uses a methodology with “poor size,” then it is likely that 
she finds 𝑋𝑋1 even if 𝑌𝑌0 is “true.” Put differently, if size is poor, then 𝑃𝑃(𝑋𝑋1|𝑌𝑌0)—
the probability of 𝑋𝑋1 conditional on 𝑌𝑌0—is high. On the other hand, if size is 
strong, then it is very unlikely that one would find 𝑋𝑋1 if 𝑌𝑌0 is “true,” that is, 
𝑃𝑃(𝑋𝑋1|𝑌𝑌0) is very low. In brief, only if size is strong, it is reasonable to conclude 
that the data supports 𝑌𝑌1, if you find 𝑋𝑋1. But if size is poor, then finding 𝑋𝑋1 does 
not allow one to conclude much, as it is likely that one finds 𝑋𝑋1 even if 𝑌𝑌0 is true. 
Therefore, if the models in CLS were shown to have strong size, this would add to 
the robustness of the conclusion in CLS that staggered boards matter for firm 
value. Vice versa, if these models were shown to have poor size, the ASDS criticism 
of the results in CLS would be more likely to be accurate. 
Correspondingly, when an empiricist uses a test with “poor power,” it is likely 
that one can find 𝑋𝑋0 even if 𝑌𝑌1 is “true” (meaning that scholars may not find an 
association between staggered boards and firm value even if such association is 
actually present in the data). That is, if power is poor, then 𝑃𝑃(𝑋𝑋0|𝑌𝑌1)—the 
probability of 𝑋𝑋0 conditional on 𝑌𝑌1—is high. Correspondingly, this implies that if 
power is poor, then finding 𝑋𝑋0 should not be interpreted as strong evidence for 𝑌𝑌0. 
On the other hand, if power is strong, then it is very unlikely that one can find 𝑋𝑋0 
if 𝑌𝑌1 is “true,” that is, 𝑃𝑃(𝑋𝑋0|𝑌𝑌1) is low. In brief, only if power is strong, it is 
reasonable to conclude that the data support 𝑌𝑌0 if you find 𝑋𝑋0. But if power is poor, 
then finding 𝑋𝑋0 does not allow one to conclude much. Therefore, only if the model 
in ASDS was shown to have strong power, their conclusion that staggered boards 
do not matter for firm value would likely be robust, while if the ASDS model had 
poor power, this would cast doubt on their conclusion. 
On these assumptions, we run 10,000 bootstrapped samples across firm-fixed-
effects regressions and change-in-value regressions. As shown below, our bootstrap 
results contradict the claim in ASDS that these methodologies likely find a 
statistically significant association even when in actuality there is none, as they show 
that both methodologies as employed in CLS have good “size,” that is, do not suffer 
from high Type I error.74 
Next, we show that the firm-fixed-effect regressions have poor power, that is, a 
limited ability to find a statistically significant association even if the sample is 
constructed such that there is an actual association between firm value and board 
structure. However, we also find that the change-in-Q regressions have much better 
power, indicating that one is much more likely to find a statistically significant 
association if there is an actual association in the data. Consistent with our results 
from Table 1 and Table 2 above, these results thus indicate that the only 
 
74 More precisely, one could say that the likelihood that our results in CLS may suffer from a Type 
I error falls within the confidence interval that we documented in both CLS and Tables 1 and 2 above. 
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methodology considered by ASDS—namely regressions with firm fixed effects—
has poor power and hence a high likelihood of Type II error. 
B. Size Test 
The first bootstrapping test we run, presented in Table 3 below, is the size test 
for the 1996–2015 sample of Table 1, Panel A, column 1. (However, the results are 
similar if we use the sample 1993–2013 or 1991–2013 as in ASDS.) Recall that with 
our procedure, the resulting bootstrapped samples are all very similar to the actual 
data. This means that each sample has the same percentage of firms with a 
staggered board in each calendar year, and the same number of firms staggering 
down and staggering up each year, as in the actual data. However, the board 
structure is randomly assigned such that there is actually no association between firm 
value and board structure in the bootstrapped samples by construction. 
 
TABLE 3: SIZE TEST—REGRESSIONS OF THE LEVEL OF Q 
This table presents bootstrap results to test the size of the pooled panel Q regressions as 
shown in column 1 of Table 1, Panel A. Each bootstrapped sample is constructed to be very 
similar to the actual data, including the cross-sectional and time-series correlation structure, 
as described in the text. We construct a total of 10,000 bootstrapped samples in which there 
is no association between Q and Staggered Board. For each bootstrapped sample, we run a 
pooled panel Q regression on Staggered Board[t-1], Ln(Assets)[t-1], Delaware incorporation[t-1], 
ROA[t-1], CAPX/Assets[t-1], R&D/ Sales[t-1], and Industry M&A volume[t-1], with year and firm 
fixed effects. In Panel A, we show the 0.5th, 1st, 2.5th, 5th, 95th, 99th and 99.5th percentile 
of the coefficient of Staggered Board[t-1] and its t-statistic across all 10,000 pooled panel 
regressions, based on robust standard errors that are clustered by firm. In Panel B, we report 
the percentage of bootstrapped samples where the t-statistic of the coefficient of Staggered 
Board[t-1] is smaller or larger than the standard critical values for double-sided tests at the 10% 
level (+/- 1.645), 5% level (+/- 1.96), and 1% level (+/- 2.326). 
 
Panel A. Percentiles of bootstrapped coefficients and t-statistics of Staggered 
Board[t-1] 
Percentile 0.50% 1% 2.50% 5% 95% 97.50% 99% 99.50% 
Coefficient -0.226 -0.202 -0.169 -0.140 0.139 0.167 0.201 0.227 
t-statistic -2.55 -2.29 -1.92 -1.62 1.49 1.78 2.11 2.30 
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Panel B. Percentage of bootstrapped t-statistics of Staggered Board[t-1] 
below/above some critical values 
Condition % of bootstraps  
t-statistic < -1.645 4.82%  
t-statistic < -1.96 2.21%  
t-statistic < -2.326 0.91%  
   
t-statistic > 1.645 3.60%  
t-statistic > 1.96 1.53%  
t-statistic > 2.326 0.44%  
 
Table 3, Panel A presents the percentiles of coefficient and t-statistics (which is 
the measure of statistical significance) of staggered boards on Q for the pooled 
panel regressions based on 10,000 bootstraps. In other words, we report how often 
we find coefficients and t-statistics of a certain size in the set of 10,000 bootstraps. 
As shown by Table 3, Panel A, we find a coefficient of the Staggered Board 
indicator of -0.226 (or even more negative) in only 0.50% of the bootstrapped 
samples. Similarly, we find a t-statistic of -2.55 (or even more negative) of the 
Staggered Board coefficient in only 0.50% of the bootstrapped samples. Using 5% as 
the level of statistical significance and using a two-sided test, we look at the values 
for the 2.5 and 97.5 percentiles. For the coefficient of the Staggered Board dummy, 
we find that a coefficient as negative as -0.169 (or even more negative) or as positive 
as 0.167 (or even more positive) occurs in no more than 5% of the bootstrapped 
samples. For the t-statistic of the coefficient of the staggered board dummy, we find 
that a t-statistic as negative as -1.92 (or even more negative) or as positive as 1.78 
(or even more positive) occurs in no more than 5% of the bootstrapped samples. 
Our bootstrapped samples thus indicate that our tests based on t-statistics have 
good size. Indeed, when one finds a t-statistic above 2 in absolute value (as we found 
in CLS and Table 1 above), it is quite rare for such a large t-statistic to occur in 
bootstrapped samples where there is no actual association (recall that we ensured 
that there is in fact no association by construction in each of these bootstrapped 
samples). Otherwise this t-statistic would be less likely to occur than in 2.5% of 
cases. We hence conclude that our pooled panel regressions have good size, which 
means that it would be very unlikely that one would find a statistically significant 
coefficient on the Staggered Board dummy using our pooled panel setup, if there was 
actually no association between board structure and Q at all (i.e., if the ASDS null 
hypothesis was “true”). 
To substantiate this assertion, consider now Table 3, Panel B, where we count 
the percentage of bootstrapped samples in which we would conclude that there is a 
statistically significant coefficient using the default critical values for the t-statistic, 
namely 1.645 for a double-sided test at the 10% confidence level, 1.96 for the 5% 
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confidence level, and 2.326 for the 1% confidence level (in graphical terms, one, two, 
and three stars after the coefficient, respectively). 
Table 3, Panel B shows that only 2.21% of the bootstrapped samples generates 
a t-statistic (of the coefficient of the Staggered Board dummy) that is -1.96 or more 
negative, and only 1.53% have a t-statistic of 1.96 or higher. Therefore, using the 5% 
confidence level (critical value of +/- 1.96), we would incorrectly conclude that there 
is a significant coefficient in 2.21%+1.53% = 3.74% of cases, which is lower—and thus 
better—than the 5% level allowed. This means that using the 5% confidence level 
(critical value of +/- 1.96), the estimation of the probability of Type I error for CLS 
is around 3.74%. In other words, there is only a 3.74% probability that CLS rejected 
the null hypothesis (Q is not associated with board structure) when the null is 
indeed “true.”  
Next, in Table 4, we essentially perform the same tests as in Table 3 but 
considering the change in Q regressions (see Table 2 above). For this test, we use 
the same bootstrapped samples as those presented in Table 3, and then calculate 1-
year, 2-year and 3-year changes in Q (i.e., three different time-horizons). 
 
TABLE 4: SIZE TESTS—REGRESSIONS OF CHANGES IN Q 
 This table presents bootstrap results to test the size of the pooled panel change in Q 
regressions as shown in column (1) of Table 2. Each bootstrapped sample is constructed to 
be very similar to the actual data, including the cross-sectional and time-series correlation 
structure, as described in the text. We construct a total of 10,000 bootstrapped samples in 
which there is no association between Q and Staggered Board. For each bootstrapped sample, 
we run a pooled panel regression of the change in Q over the next 1, 2, or 3 years on ∆ 
Staggered Board[t-1,t], ∆ Ln(Assets)[t-1,t], ∆ ROA[t-1,t], ∆ CAPX/Assets[t-1,t], ∆ R&D/Sales[t-1,t], and ∆ 
Industry M&A volume[t-1,t]. We report the percentage of bootstrapped samples where the t-
statistic of the coefficient of ∆ Staggered Board[t-1] is smaller or larger than the standard critical 
values for double-sided tests at the 10% level (+/- 1.645), 5% level (+/- 1.96) and 1% level (+/- 
2.326). The change in Q over the next 1, 2, or 3 years is captured by the variable ∆ Q[t, t+1], ∆ 
Q[t, t+2]) and ∆ Q[t, t+3]), respectively. 
Dependent variable: ∆ Q[t, t+1] ∆ Q[t, t+2] ∆ Q[t, t+3] 
 
 
     
Condition % of bootstraps  
t-statistic < -1.645 4.39% 4.19% 4.00%  
t-statistic < -1.96 1.86% 2.20% 1.97%  
t-statistic < -2.326 0.71% 0.76% 0.65%  
     
t-statistic > 1.645 6.41% 6.63% 4.17%  
t-statistic > 1.96 3.53% 3.70% 1.90%  
t-statistic > 2.326 1.39% 1.68% 0.62%  
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 The results for the change in Q regressions show again that these tests have 
good size. Over the 1-year, 2-year, and 3-year horizons, and using the 5% confidence 
level (critical value of +/- 1.96), we would incorrectly conclude that the coefficient 
of staggered board is significant only in (1.86+3.53=) 5.39%, (2.2+3.7=) 5.9%, and 
(1.97+1.9) = 3.97% of the cases, respectively, all very similar to the 5% level. 
C. Power Test 
In this section, we report the results for the “power” test. In this test, we 
generate bootstrapped samples where there is an association between adopting and 
dismissing a staggered board and Q by construction. In other words, for the power 
test we use samples that are constructed such that the level of Q permanently 
increases (decreases) after a firm adopts (removes) a staggered board, and where 
we test whether firm-fixed-effect regression and change-in-value regressions can 
find this association. Recall that every year, a certain number of firms adopts and 
dismisses a staggered board in the data. The number of firms in each bootstrapped 
sample that adopts and dismisses a staggered board is the same as the number of 
firms that do so in the actual data, for each calendar year. 
We consider two scenarios: an immediate change in Q after a change in board 
structure, and a gradual change in Q after a change in board structure. In both cases, 
we consider only a symmetric change in Q, so that Q always increases after the 
adoption of a staggered board by the same amount as Q decreases after a staggered 
board’s removal. This choice is motivated by the finding in CLS that the 
differences between changes in Q (in absolute value) for adoptions versus 
dismissals of staggered boards are statistically insignificant.75 In particular: 
i. in the first scenario of an immediate and permanent change in Q after a 
change in board structure, the permanent change in Q is set equal to 0.098 (based 
on Table 1, Panel A, column 1 above and Table 3, column 6 of CLS)76 for adoptions 
and -0.098 for removals. 
ii. in the second scenario of a gradual change in Q after a change in board 
structure, we use the results of Table 4, columns 7, 8, and 9 of CLS77 and increase 
Q for the first year after the change by 0.00138, for the second year by 0.0728, and 
for the third year and thereafter by 0.135. 
In Table 5, we show the results for pooled panel regressions where the “true” 
coefficient of staggered board on firm value equals 0.098. (To save space, here we 
only show the results for the immediate change, as the results for a gradual change 
are basically the same.) In other words, we bootstrap 10,000 samples where the data 
is constructed such that the adoption (dismissal) of a staggered board is associated 
 
75 See Cremers et al., Staggered Boards, supra note 5, at 430. 
76 Id. at 429. 
77 Id. at 431. 
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with an increase (decrease) in Q of 0.098, and report the percentage of 
bootstrapped samples in which we would (correctly) conclude that the coefficient 
of the Staggered Board indicator is statistically significant at various levels of 
statistical significance using firm-fixed-effect regressions. 
 
TABLE 5: POWER TESTS—REGRESSIONS OF THE LEVEL OF Q 
This table presents bootstrap results to test the power of the pooled panel Q regressions 
as shown in Table 1. Each bootstrapped sample is constructed to be very similar to the actual 
data, including the cross-sectional and time-series correlation structure, as described in the 
text. We construct a total of 10,000 bootstrapped samples in which there is an association 
between Q and Staggered Board, where the data is constructed such that an adoption 
(removal) of a staggered board is associated with an increase in Q of 0.098. For each 
bootstrapped sample, we run a pooled panel Q regression on Staggered Board[t-1], Ln(Assets)[t-
1], Delaware incorporation[t-1], ROA[t-1], CAPX/Assets[t-1], R&D/ Sales[t-1], and Industry M&A 
volume[t-1], with year and firm fixed effects. We report the percentage of bootstrapped 
samples where the t-statistic of the coefficient of Staggered Board[t-1] is smaller or larger than 
the standard critical values for double-sided tests at the 10% level (+/- 1.645), 5% level (+/- 
1.96) and 1% level (+/- 2.326). 
 
Condition % of bootstraps  
t-statistic < -1.645 0.47%  
t-statistic < -1.96 0.17%  
t-statistic < -2.326 0.05%  
   
t-statistic > 1.645 18.68%  
t-statistic > 1.96 11.17%  
t-statistic > 2.326 5.23%  
 
Table 5 indicates that the pooled panel regressions with firm fixed effects have 
poor power, by showing that for samples with an actual association (here by 
construction) between having a staggered board and Q, one would be unlikely to 
find this association in the data using this estimator. Indeed, Table 5 shows that we 
find a statistically significant coefficient that is positive at the 5% confidence level 
(i.e. with a critical value of +/- 1.96) in only 11.17% of cases. This implies that, with 
88.8% likelihood, we would reject any association between staggered boards and Q, 
even if there were a “true,” strongly positive association in the data. 
Correspondingly, this means that at the 5% confidence level (critical value of +/- 
1.96), the probability of a Type II error is 88.8%.78 
 
78 Figure 2, which is included in this document’s appendix, visualizes some of our bootstrap results as 
reported in Table 5. In particular, Figure 2 presents the histogram of the bootstrapped coefficients of Staggered 
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As shown by Table 6 below, the power test produces, instead, much improved 
results when we use change in Q regressions. In this case, we show results for both 
the first scenario, which considers a permanent, immediate change in Q after a 
change in board structure (in Panel A), and the second scenario, which assumes a 
gradual change in Q (in Panel B).  
 
TABLE 6: POWER TESTS—REGRESSIONS OF CHANGES IN Q 
This table presents bootstrap results to test the power of the pooled panel change in Q 
regressions as shown in Table 2. Each bootstrapped sample is constructed to be very similar 
to the actual data, including the cross-sectional and time-series correlation structure, as 
described in the text. We construct a total of 10,000 bootstrapped samples in which there is 
an association between Q and Staggered Board. For each bootstrapped sample, we run a 
pooled panel regression of the change in Q over the next 1, 2, or 3 years on ∆ Staggered Board[t-
1,t], ∆ Ln(Assets)[t-1,t], ∆ ROA[t-1,t], ∆ CAPX/Assets[t-1,t], ∆ R&D/Sales[t-1,t], and ∆ Industry M&A 
volume[t-1,t]. We report the percentage of bootstrapped samples where the t-statistic of the 
coefficient of ∆ Staggered Board[t-1] is smaller or larger than the standard critical values for 
double-sided tests at the 10% level (+/- 1.645), 5% level (+/- 1.96), and 1% level (+/- 2.326). 
The change in Q over the next 1, 2, or 3 years is captured by the dependent variable ∆ Q[t, t+1], 
∆ Q[t, t+2]), and ∆ Q[t, t+3]), respectively. 
 
Panel A. Power tests assuming an immediate change in Q following a change in 
board structure 
Dependent variable: ∆ Q[t, t+1] ∆ Q[t, t+2] ∆ Q[t, t+3] 
 
 
     
Condition % of bootstraps  
t-statistic < -1.645 0 0.03% 0.04%  
t-statistic < -1.96 0 0.01% 0.02%  
t-statistic < -2.326 0 0 0.01%  
     
t-statistic > 1.645 84.10% 68.38% 55.35%  
t-statistic > 1.96 76.56% 57.71% 43.98%  
t-statistic > 2.326 65.77% 44.97% 31.24%  
 
 
Board in Panel A and the bootstrapped t-statistics of Staggered Board in Panel B. The results in Panel A show 
that the estimated coefficients of Staggered Board center around 0.098, consistent with the actual change in Q 
after a change in board structure, while the results in Panel B show that these coefficients are estimated with 
considerable noise or statistical uncertainty. 
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Panel B. Power tests assuming a gradual change in Q following a change in 
board structure 
Dependent variable: ∆ Q[t, t+1] ∆ Q[t, t+2] ∆ Q[t, t+3] 
 
 
     
Condition % of bootstraps  
t-statistic < -1.645 5.25% 0.06% 0.01%  
t-statistic < -1.96 2.78% 0.02% 0.00%  
t-statistic < -2.326 1.25% 0.01% 0.00%  
     
t-statistic > 1.645 5.70% 49.51% 76.45%  
t-statistic > 1.96 2.79% 37.92% 66.70%  
t-statistic > 2.326 1.06% 25.36% 54.38%  
 
Table 6, Panel A—for the immediate and permanent change scenario—shows 
that the change in Q regressions have much better power than the pooled panel 
regressions with firm fixed effects, but also that this power declines if we look at 
longer horizons. This make sense when the change in Q is actually immediate, such 
as in the bootstrapped samples used in Panel A, as in this case looking at longer 
horizons only adds statistical noise. 
The results in Table 6, Panel A imply that if the bootstrapped samples are such 
that the “true” coefficient of Staggered Board equals 0.098, and using the 5% 
confidence level (critical value of +/- 1.96), we would reject the null hypothesis of 
no statistically significant association in 77% of cases over a 1-year horizon, 58% of 
cases over a 2-year horizon, and 44% of cases over a 3-year horizon. In other words, 
the regressions of changes in Q on changes in board structure would indicate a 
statistically significant coefficient of Staggered Board over a 1-year horizon in about 
77% of the cases (compared to about 11% for the firm-fixed-effects regressions). 
Finally, Table 6, Panel B—for the gradual change scenario—corresponds to 
what we find in the actual data (see Table 2 above). Recall that here the “true” 
coefficient of Staggered Board equals 0.00138 for the 1-year change, 0.0728 for the 2-
year change, and 0.135 for the 3-year change (see Table 2, column 1 above). 
As shown by Table 6, Panel B using the 5% confidence level (critical value of 
+/- 1.96), there is, as expected, very low power to find the small 1-year change. This 
is consistent with the results reported in Table 2 above (and in Table 4 of CLS), 
where we show that the change in Q is significant only after the first year in the 
change in the board structure. Conversely, the 2-year change of 0.0728 has 
reasonably good power, and the 3-year change has even better power. More 
specifically, with the 5 percent confidence level (critical value of +/- 1.96), we would 
reject the null hypothesis of no statistically significant association in 66.7% of the 
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cases. Hence, Table 6, Panel B naturally finds that power increases over longer 
time-horizons, consistent with the “true” coefficient actually increasing over longer 
time-horizons. 
In summary, the power test indicates that if there is actually an association 
between firm value and board structure, one would be considerably more likely to 
find this association by using regressions of changes in Q on changes in board 
structure than through firm-fixed-effects regressions. This is consistent with the 
results presented above, where even for the shorter time period starting in 2003, 
the change-in-Q regressions using actual data show a large, positive, and statistically 
significant coefficient of Staggered Board, while the analogous results for the same 
sample but using firm fixed effects regressions are insignificant.79 
Therefore, our bootstrapping tests confirm that the results in ASDS can be 
explained by their use of a statistical methodology with poor power (i.e. firm 
fixed effect regressions). It follows that their finding of insignificant results 
when they use fairly short time periods cannot be interpreted as evidence against 
an association between firm value and board structure, especially when another 
methodology with much stronger statistical power (i.e., change-in-value 
regressions) results in robust evidence for such association using exactly the 
same data sample. 
IV. ADDITIONAL ROBUSTNESS 
As hinted above, CLS uses multiple identification strategies, in addition to 
pooled panel regression with firm fixed effects and change-in-Q regressions, to 
address the selection concerns that follow from the endogenous choice of board 
structure.80 In discussing CLS’s findings, however, ASDS exclusively focus on the 
firm-fixed-effects pooled panel regressions, while ignoring the results for 
regressions of changes in Q on changes in board structure, or the various other 
tests CLS perform. In this last section, we offer a brief recap of these additional 
tests, which all confirm the result of a positive association between staggered 
boards and firm value. 
In particular: 
i. We confirm the positive impact of the staggered board though a stock 
portfolio analysis, which can be interpreted as a long-term event study around 
changes in board structure.81 We present abnormal stock returns of monthly 
portfolios of firms that have staggered up (in the long portfolio) and firms that 
have staggered down (in the short portfolio) around board staggering and de-
staggering events in our sample of firms during the time period from 1978 to 
 
79 See supra Section II.C. 
80 See supra Section I.B. 
81 See Cremers et al., Staggered Boards, supra note 5, at 430. 
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2015.82 In particular, in the 12-12 portfolio (constructed so to hold stocks in the 12-
month period before the change in board structure until 12 months thereafter, for 
a total of 24 months for each stock with a change in board structure), we obtained 
positive and statistically significant alphas in the four-factor, three-factor, and 
market factor models.83 
ii. We incorporate possible selection effects through the creation of multiple 
matched samples based on different matching procedures.84 In each matched 
sample, each firm with a changing board structure (i.e., a “treated” firm) in a given 
year is matched to a firm with the same ex ante board structure and similar 
observable characteristics that relate to board structure, but which did not change 
its board structure in that year (i.e., a “control” firm).85 The matched samples 
confirm the positive (negative) relation between the adoption (removal) of a 
staggered board and firm value.86 
ASDS briefly observe that CLS performs a “matched sample study.”87 
However, they do not discuss this additional methodology, except for observing in 
a footnote that results for matched samples “naturally depend on the quality of the 
match between firms subject to the change in staggered board and those serving as 
control firms.”88 For this reason, we employ four different matching procedures in 
CLS,89 although ASDS do not discuss whether our matched samples are of 
sufficient quality, or by what criteria to assess matching quality. In CLS we also 
show detailed comparisons between treated and control firms, which indicate that 
differences across these samples are consistently minor, both economically and 
statistically.90 This is consistent with the assumption that the reliability of matched 
samples in the staggered board context depend on the control firms matching 
treated firms with changing board structures in essential characteristics but for the 
changes in board structures.91 Of course, we welcome constructive criticism on the 
quality of our matching, though in the meantime it is worth highlighting that 
matching represents a worthwhile strategy to mitigate endogeneity concerns in the 
staggered board debate. 
 
82 Id. 
83 Id. at 432 tbl.5. 
84 Id. at 434. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. at 435 tbl.7. 
87 Amihud et al., supra note 6, at 1484. 
88 Id. at 1485 n.32. 
89 See Cremers et al., Staggered Boards, supra note 5, at 434. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. 
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iii. We employ the dynamic generalized method of moments (GMM) 
estimator92 proposed by Arellano and Bover93 and Blundell and Bond.94 As 
explained by Wintoki, Linck, and Netter,95 this methodology estimates a 
simultaneous system in which firm value, board structure, and other key corporate 
characteristics are all endogenous and dynamically interrelated. Using a system 
where we can reject that the instruments are weak and that accounts for 
unobservable heterogeneity using firm fixed effects, the dynamic GMM results 
show a positive (negative) relation between adopting (removing) a staggered board 
and firm value that is strongly statistically significant.96 
iv. We conduct a long-term event study exploiting plausibly exogenous 
variation in board structure due to changes in Massachusetts corporate law.97 In 
1990, Massachusetts made staggered boards “quasi-mandatory” by requiring firms 
incorporated in the state to adopt a staggered board by default and making it 
difficult to opt out of this requirement.98 In CLS, we thus compare the value of 
Massachusetts firms in the few years before and after this legal change in a matched 
sample of firms, where the control firms are incorporated outside of Massachusetts 
but have a similar size, are in the same industry, and have the same board structure 
as the Massachusetts firms. After the legal change, the value of the Massachusetts 
firms increased more than the value of their control firms.99 While ASDS mention 
older studies that use Massachusetts as a quasi-natural experiment or more recent 
but still unpublished studies, they do not discuss CLS’s long-term event study 
employing the change in Massachusetts corporate law.100 
v. To mitigate the endogeneity concerns of the association between staggered 
boards and firm value, CLS also examine an important economic channel through 
which a staggered board could be associated with an increase in long-term firm 
value, i.e., the bonding hypothesis of takeover defenses.101 Under this hypothesis, a 
staggered board would provide an efficient commitment device towards the firm-
specific investments of a firm’s stakeholders, such as top employees, large 
customers, suppliers, and strategic alliance partners. Empirically, we find 
confirmation for the bonding hypothesis of staggered boards by documenting that 
 
92 Id. at 434-36. 
93 Manuel Arellano & Olympia Bover, Another Look at the Instrumental Variable Estimation of 
Error-Component Models, 68 J. ECONOMETRICS 29 (1995). 
94 Richard Blundell & Stephen Bond, Initial Conditions and Moment Restrictions in Dynamic 
Panel Data Models, 87 J. ECONOMETRICS 115 (1998). 
95 M. Babajide Wintoki, James S. Linck & Jeffry M. Netter, Endogeneity and the Dynamics of 
Internal Corporate Governance, 105 J. FIN. ECON. 581 (2012). 
96 Cremers et al., Staggered Boards, supra note 5, at 436 tbl.8. 
97 Id. at 436-37. 
98 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 156D, § 8.06(b)–(g) (2018). 
99 Cremers et al., Staggered Boards, supra note 5, at 438 tbl.9. 
100 Amihud et al., supra note 6, at 1502-03. 
101 Cremers et al., Staggered Boards, supra note 5, at 439-42. 
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the adoption (removal) of a staggered board has a more positive (negative) 
association with firm value among firms with stronger stakeholder relationships, 
such as firms with large customers, productive employees, and in strategic 
alliances.102 We similarly find that the adoption (removal) of staggered boards has 
a more positive (negative) association with firm value among firms whose projects 
require longer-term investments and are likely harder to value by outside investors, 
such as firms with more investments in innovation and intangibles.103 
CONCLUSION  
In this Essay, we examine the criticism offered by a recent paper coauthored by 
ASDS of our prior staggered board studies and, in particular, the 2017 CLS study 
published in the Journal of Financial Economics. Under this criticism, CLS’s 
estimation method (i.e., pooled panel regressions with firm fixed effects) would not 
consider the changing nature of firm characteristics over time. Further, we also 
examine the main empirical claim of ASDS, namely that when the appropriate 
corrections are employed in estimation methods, there is no statistically significant 
association between staggered boards and firm value. 
We show that ASDS’s criticism of our finding that the adoption of a staggered 
board is positively associated with firm value is unwarranted. Correspondingly, 
their claim that there is no association between staggered boards and firm value is 
likely to be statistically inaccurate, as we also show that the insignificant findings of 
ASDS are the result of using a methodology with poor power (i.e., pooled panel Q 
regressions with firm fixed effects). In contrast, we show that the result that firm 
value tends to increase (decrease) after firms adopt (remove) a staggered board is 
strongly statistically significant even over fairly short time periods when a 
methodology is used that has relatively strong statistical power (i.e., change in Q 
regressions).  Lastly, we also show that the estimation methods in CLS have strong 
size, meaning that these methods would be unlikely to find a statistically significant 
association between staggered boards and firm value if such association was not, in 
fact, supported by the data. 
We conclude that ASDS does not settle the staggered board debate. 
Nonetheless, it does contribute to advance that debate by confirming that the 
weight of the available empirical evidence strongly suggests that the earlier value-
decreasing view of staggered boards is unsupported by the data and should thus not 
inform policymaking. 
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APPENDIX 
FIGURE 2: HISTOGRAMS FOR POWER TESTS OF REGRESSIONS  
OF THE LEVEL OF Q 
Figure 2, Panel A presents the histogram of the bootstrapped coefficient of Staggered 
Board in Table 5, Panel A. Figure 2, Panel B presents the histogram of the bootstrapped t-
statistics of coefficient of Staggered Board in Table 5, Panel B. The histograms are based on 
the same bootstrap results as reported in Table 5. Each bootstrapped sample is constructed 
to be very similar to the actual data, including the cross-sectional and time-series 
correlation structure, as described in the text. We construct a total of 10,000 bootstrapped 
samples in which there is an association between Q and Staggered Board, where the data is 
constructed such that an adoption (dismissal) of a staggered board is association with an 
increase in Q of 0.098. 
 
Panel A. Histogram of the bootstrapped coefficient of Staggered Board 
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Panel B. Histogram of the bootstrapped t-statistic of the coefficient of 
Staggered Board 
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